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  OPINION 
_____________________  
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Marquetta Mitchell pleaded guilty to two 
counts of violating 21 U.S.C. § 846 by attempting and conspiring to distribute and 
to possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms of crack cocaine.  The plea 
agreement contained a broad waiver of her right to appeal and to pursue collateral 
relief.  Thereafter, the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania sentenced Mitchell to the mandatory minimum of 120 months’ 
imprisonment.   
Despite the appellate waiver, Mitchell filed a notice of appeal the same day 
that she was sentenced.
1
  Mitchell does not assert that the appellate waiver was 
unknowing or involuntary.  Nor does she argue that the issue she seeks to raise 
falls outside the scope of the appellate waiver to which she agreed.  And she does 
not directly assert that enforcement of the appellate waiver would result in a 
miscarriage of justice.  Rather, Mitchell contends that the appellate waiver “was 
void from its inception” because it violated public policy.2  Appellant’s Br. at 19.  
If Mitchell succeeds in having the appellate waiver set aside, she also argues that 
the District Court erred by finding that she failed to qualify for the safety-valve 
provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) by not making a timely, complete, and truthful 
disclosure of all information and evidence concerning the offenses, which would 
have permitted the District Court to depart below the mandatory minimum 
sentence.
3
   
                                                 
1
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
2
 The determination of whether an appellate waiver is valid presents an issue of law 
subject to plenary review.  United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 
2001).   
3
 We review a District Court’s factual finding under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) for 
clear error.  United States v. Sabir, 117 F.3d 750, 752 (3d Cir. 1997).   
In United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 2001), the defendant 
argued that his appellate waiver should be set aside as “contrary to public policy” 
because a defendant cannot ever knowingly or voluntarily waive his “right[] to 
appeal future errors.”  We rejected that argument and held that “waivers of appeals 
are generally permissible if entered into knowingly and voluntarily, unless they 
work a miscarriage of justice.”  Id. at 558.   
Nonetheless, Mitchell argues that appellate waivers are contrary to public 
policy and should not be enforceable.  She cites the ethical concerns that arise 
when defense counsel advises a client about waiving a claim of ineffective 
assistance or a prosecutor requires a waiver of the right to raise claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.  See Advisory 
Comm. of the Sup. Ct. of Mo., Formal Op. 126 (2009) (listing opinions).  Indeed, 
we have recognized that ineffective assistance of counsel may be a basis for setting 
aside an appellate or collateral review waiver.  See United States v. Shedrick, 493 
F.3d 292, 298 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (declaring that “[e]nforcing a collateral-attack 
waiver where constitutionally deficient lawyering prevented [a defendant] from 
understanding his plea or from filing a direct appeal as permitted by his plea 
agreement would result in a miscarriage of justice”); see also United States v. 
Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25 n.9 (1st Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that the miscarriage of 
justice concept is “infinitely variable, but, by way of illustration, we would include 
within it situations in which appellants claim . . . that the plea proceedings were 
tainted by ineffective assistance of counsel”).   
We decline to adopt the blanket rule Mitchell advocates for several reasons.  
See Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562 (“declin[ing] to adopt a blanket rule prohibiting all 
review of certain otherwise valid waivers of appeals”).  First, invalidating all 
appellate waivers because of the ethical concerns pointed out by Mitchell would 
“ignore[] that waivers of appeals may assist defendants in making favorable plea 
bargains” as they “provid[e] defendants a valuable bargaining chip in the plea 
process.”  Id.  Second, a blanket rule invalidating appellate waivers would fail to 
account for the variance in the terms of appellate waivers and that some appellate 
waivers may not preclude a defendant from raising an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.  See id at 562-63.  Third, setting aside all appellate waivers based 
on these ethical concerns would turn a blind eye to our jurisprudence recognizing 
that a criminal defendant may thwart enforcement of an appellate waiver by 
showing that the ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Shedrick, 493 F.3d at 298 & n.6.  Fourth, Mitchell’s rule fails to 
appreciate that ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally are not reviewed 
on direct appeal.  See United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271-72 (3d Cir. 
2003) (citing Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003)). Finally, the ethical 
concerns that arise from waiving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as the 
Missouri ethics opinion notes, do not “prohibit a defense counsel and prosecutor 
from entering into a plea agreement that involves waiver of other post-conviction 
rights,” such as the right to appeal.  Advisory Comm. of the Sup. Ct. of Mo., 
Formal Op. 126 (2009).  Rather, we adhere to the case-by-case evaluation we 
embraced in Khattak, which requires determining the validity of each appellate 
waiver based on its terms and the circumstances in that case.  See 273 F.3d at 563; 
see also United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 535 (3d Cir. 2008) (instructing 
that the “language of a waiver, like the language of a contract, matters greatly”).   
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the sentencing issue Mitchell 
seeks to appeal, which does not allege the ineffective assistance of counsel, falls 
within the scope of the appellate waiver to which she knowingly and voluntarily 
agreed.  In light of the circumstances of this case, enforcement of the appellate 
waiver would not work a miscarriage of justice.  Accordingly, we will enforce the 
appellate waiver and will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
